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Abstract. Building on a simple modal logic of context, the paper presents a dy-
namic logic characterizing operations of contraction and expansion on theories.
We investigate the mathematical properties of the logic, and show how it can cap-
ture some aspects of the dynamics of normative systems once they are viewed as
logical theories.
1 Introduction
In artificial intelligence as well as in philosophy, contexts—when addressed formally—
are often thought of as sets of models of given theories [7] or, more simply, as sets of
possible worlds [17]. Once a context is viewed as a set of models/possible worlds, its
content is nothing but the set of logical formulae it validates or, otherwise, its theory or
intension.
This perspective has been used, in [9], to develop a simple modal logic for repre-
senting and reasoning about contexts. This logic is based on a set of modal operators
[X ] where X is a label denoting the context of a theory. A formula [X ]ϕ reads ‘in the
context of X it is the case that ϕ’. The present paper develops a ‘dynamification’ of
such logic by studying the two following operations:
– Context expansion (in symbols X+ψ), by means of which a context is restricted and
hence, its intension—its logical theory—strengthened. Such operation is similar to
the operation for announcement studied in DEL [21]. Its function is to restrict the
space of possible worlds accepted by the context X to the worlds where ψ is true.
– Context contraction (in symbols X−ψ), by means of which a context is enlarged
giving rise to a weaker logical theory. The function of this operation is to add to the
space of possible worlds accepted by context X some worlds in which ψ is false.
The resulting dynamic logic is studied from the point of view of its mathematical prop-
erties and illustrated through a running example. Just like the context logic introduced in
[9] was developed to cope with some problems in the analysis of normative systems, its
dynamic version will be illustrated by resorting to examples taken from the normative
domain. In particular, we will link context expansion to some kind of “promulgation”
of norms and context contraction to some kind of “derogation” of norms.1
1 The terms promulgation and derogation are borrowed from the first paper addressing norm
dynamics by formal means, that is, [2].
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This illustration will highlight the features that norm dynamics shares with theory
dynamics once norms are viewed as logical statements of the type: “a certain fact ϕ im-
plies a violation”. Such view of norms builds on those approaches to deontic logic which
stemmed from the work of Anderson [4] and Kanger [12]. Although rather abstract and,
under many respects, simplistic such view of norms has received considerable attention
by recent developments in the logical analysis of normative systems within the artificial
intelligence community (e.g., [1, 13, 18]).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will briefly present the modal logic
of context of [9]. Section 3 is devoted to extend this logic with the two events X+ψ and
X−ψ which allow to model context dynamics. Finally, in Section 4, we will apply our
logical framework to norm change, i.e. norm promulgation and norm derogation. The
results of this application are compared with related work in Section 5. Conclusions
follow.
2 A Modal Logic of Context
The logic presented in this section is a simple modal logic designed to represent and
reason about a localized notion of validity, that is, of validity with respect to all models
in a given set. Such a given set is what is here called a context.
Let Φ = {p, q, . . .} be a countable non-empty set of propositional letters, and let
C = {X,Y, . . .} be a countable set of contexts. LProp is the propositional language.
2.1 Models
Definition 1. A context model (Cxt-model) M = (W,R, I) is a tuple such that:
– W is a nonempty set of possible worlds;
– R : C −→ 2W maps each context X to a subset of W ;
– I : Φ −→ 2W is a valuation.
We write RX for R(X) and w ∈ M for w ∈ W . For w ∈ M, the couple (M, w) is a
pointed context model.
A Cxt-model represents a logical space together with some of its possible restrictions,
i.e., the contexts. In our case, contexts are used to represent the restrictions to those sets
of propositional models satisfying the rules stated by a given normative system [9]. Let
us illustrate how they can be used to model normative systems.
Example 1 (A toy normative system). Consider a normative system according to which:
motorized vehicles must have a numberplate ; motorized vehicles must have an insur-
ance; bikes should not have an insurance; bikes are classified as not being a motorized
vehicle. Once a designated atom V is introduced in the language, which represents a
notion of “violation” [4], the statements above obtain a simple representation:
Rule 1: (mt ∧ ¬pl) → V Rule 2: (mt ∧ ¬in) → V
Rule 3: (bk ∧ in) → V Rule 4: bk → ¬mt
A Cxt-modelM = (W,R, I), where I maps atoms mt , pl , in , bk and V to subsets of
W , models the normative system above as a context X if RX coincides with the subset
of W where Rules 1-4 are true according to propositional logic.
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2.2 Logic
The logic Cxt is now presented which captures the notion of validity with respect
to a context. To talk about Cxt-models we use a modal language LCxt containing
modal operators [X ] for every X ∈ C, plus the universal modal operator [U]. The set of
well-formed formulae of LCxt is defined by the following BNF:
LCxt : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [U]ϕ | [X ]ϕ
where p ranges over Φ and X over C. The connectives ,∨,→,↔ and the dual
operators 〈X〉 are defined as usual within LCxt as: 〈X〉ϕ = ¬[X ]¬ϕ, for X ∈ C∪{U}.
We interpret formulas of LCxt in a Cxt-models as follows: the [U] operator is inter-
preted as the universal modality [5], and the [X ] operators model restricted validity.
Definition 2. Let M be a Cxt-model, and let w ∈M.
M, w |= p iff w ∈ I(p);
M, w |= [X ]ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ RX , M, w′ |= ϕ;
M, w |= [U]ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W , M, w′ |= ϕ.
and as usual for the Boolean operators. Formula ϕ is valid in M, noted M |= ϕ,
iff M, w |= ϕ for all w ∈ M. ϕ is Cxt-valid, noted |=Cxt ϕ, iff M |= ϕ for all
Cxt-models M.
Cxt-validity is axiomatized by the following schemas:
(P) all propositional axiom schemas and rules
(4XY ) [X ]ϕ → [Y ][X ]ϕ
(5XY ) 〈X〉ϕ → [Y ]〈X〉ϕ
(TU) [U]ϕ → ϕ
(KX) [X ](ϕ → ϕ′) → ([X ]ϕ → [X ]ϕ′)
(NX) IF  ϕ THEN  [X ]ϕ
where X,Y ∈ C ∪ {U}. The [X ] and [Y ] operators are K45 modalities strengthened
with the two inter-contextual interaction axioms 4XY and 5XY . [U] is an S5 modality.
Provability of a formula ϕ, noted Cxt ϕ, is defined as usual.
Logic Cxt is well-behaved for both axiomatizability and complexity.
Theorem 1 ([9]). |=Cxt ϕ iff Cxt ϕ.
Theorem 2. Deciding Cxt-validity is coNP-complete.
Proof (Sketch of proof). Satisfiability of S5 formulas is decidable in nondeterministic
polynomial time [5]. Let L[U] be the language built from the set of atoms Φ ∪ C (sup-
posing Φ and C are disjoint) and containing only one modal operator [U]. That is:
L[U] : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [U]ϕ
where p ranges over Φ∪C. It gets a natural interpretation on context models where [U] is
the global modality. Then one can show that the following is a satisfiability-preserving
polytime reduction f of LCxt to L[U]: f(p) = p; f(¬ϕ) = ¬f(ϕ); f(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) =
f(ϕ) ∧ f(ϕ′); f([U]ϕ) = [U]f(ϕ); f([X ]ϕ) = [U](X → f(ϕ)).
The same argument proves linear time complexity if the alphabet Φ is finite.
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Another interesting property of Cxt is that every formula ofLCxt is provably equiv-
alent to a formula without nested modalities, as the following proposition shows. We
first formally define the language without nested modalities:
L1Cxt : ϕ ::= α | [X ]α | [U]α | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where α ranges over LProp and X over C. This result is of use in Proposition 3.
Proposition 1. For all ϕ ∈ LCxt there is ϕ1 ∈ L1Cxt such that Cxt ϕ ↔ ϕ1.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The Boolean cases clearly work. If ϕ is of the form [X ]ψ
with X ∈ C ∪ {U} then by IH there are αk, αij , βi ∈ LProp such that





([Xi]αi1 ∨ . . . ∨ [Xi]αini ∨ 〈Xi〉βi))).
However, using (4XY ) and (5XY ), one can easily show that
Cxt [X ](αk ∨
∨
i∈Nnk




([Xi]αi1 ∨ . . . ∨ [Xi]αini ∨ 〈Xi〉βi))).
This completes the proof.
2.3 Normative Systems in Cxt
We are ready to provide an object-level representation of Example 1. The contextual
operators [X ] and the universal operator [U] can be used to define the concepts of classi-
ficatory rule, obligation and permission which are needed to model normative systems.
Classificatory rules are of the form “ϕ counts as ψ in the normative system X” and their
function in a normative systems is to specify classifications between different concepts
[15]. For example, according to the classificatory rule “in the context of Europe, a piece
of paper with a certain shape, color, etc. counts as a 5 Euro bill”, in Europe a piece of
paper with a certain shape, color, etc. should be classified as a 5 Euro bill. The concept
of classificatory rule is expressed by the following abbreviation:
ϕ ⇒X ψ def= [X ](ϕ → ψ)
where ϕ ⇒X ψ reads ‘ϕ counts as ψ in normative system X’. As done already in
Example 1, by introducing the violation atom V we can obtain a reduction of deontic
logic to logic Cxt along the lines first explored by Anderson [4]. As far as obligations
are concerned, we introduce operators of the form OX which are used to specify what
is obligatory in the context of a certain normative system X :
OXϕ
def
= ¬ϕ ⇒X V
According to this definition, ‘ϕ is obligatory within context X’ is identified with ‘¬ϕ
counts as a violation in normative system X’. Note that we have the following
Cxt-theorem:
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Cxt ((ϕ ⇒X ψ) ∧ (ϕ ⇒X ¬ψ)) → OX¬ϕ (1)
Every OX obeys axiom K and necessitation, and is therefore a normal modal operator.
Cxt OX(ϕ → ψ) → (OXϕ → OXψ) (2)
IF Cxt ϕ THEN Cxt OXϕ (3)
Note that the formula OX⊥ is consistent, hence our deontic operator does not satisfy
the D axiom.
We define the permission operator in the standard way as the dual of the obligation




Formula PUϕ should be read “ϕ is deontically possible”.
Example 2 (Talking about a toy normative system). Consider again the normative sys-
tem of Example 1. We can now express in Cxt that Rules 1-4 explicitly belong to
context X :
Rule 1: OX(mt → pl) Rule 2: OX(mt → in)
Rule 3: OX(bk → ¬in) Rule 4: bk ⇒X ¬mt
Rules 1′-4′ explicitly localize the validity of Rules 1-4 of Example 1 to context X .
Logic Cxt is therefore enough expressive to represent several (possibly inconsistent)
normative systems at the same time.
3 Dynamic Context Logic
In the present section we ‘dynamify’ logic Cxt.
3.1 Two Relations on Models
We first define the relations X+ψ−→ and X−ψ−→ on the set of pointed Cxt-models.
Definition 3. Let (M, w) = (W,R, I, w) and (M′, w′) = (W ′, R′, I ′, w′) be two
pointed Cxt-models, and let ϕ ∈ LCxt and X ∈ C.
We set (M, w) X+ψ−→ (M′, w′) iff W = W ′, w = w′, I = I ′, and
– R′Y = RY if Y = X;
– R′X = RX ∩ ||ψ||M.
We set (M, w) X−ψ−→ (M′, w′) iff W = W ′, w = w′, I = I ′, and
– R′Y = RY if Y = X;
– R′X =
{
RX if M, w |= ¬[X ]ψ ∨ [U]ψ
RX ∪ S otherwise, for some ∅ = S ⊆ ||¬ψ||M
In case (M, w) X+ψ−→ (M′, w′) (resp. (M, w) X−ψ−→ (M′, w′)), we say that M′ is a
(context) expansion (resp. contraction) of M.
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In the above definition, ||ψ||M = {w ∈ M : M, w |= ψ}. So in both cases, it is only
the context X which changes from M to M′. In the first case, it is restricted to the
worlds that satisfy ψ, and in the second case, it is enlarged with some worlds which
satisfy ¬ψ, except if such worlds do not exist in the model ([U]ψ) or if ¬ϕ is already
consistent with the context (¬[X ]ψ). Note that there might be several contractions of a
given Cxt-model but there is always a unique expansion. The relation X−ψ−→ thus defines
implicitly a family of contraction operations. The following proposition shows that X−ψ−→
is essentially the converse relation of X+ψ−→.
Proposition 2. Let (M, w) and (M′, w′) be two pointed Cxt-models and ψ ∈ LCxt.
Then (M, w) X+ψ−→ (M′, w′) iff (M′, w′) X−ψ−→ (M, w) and M′, w′ |= [X ]ψ.
Proof. The left to right direction is clear. Assume that (M′, w′) X−ψ−→ (M, w) and
M′, w′ |= [X ]ψ. Then R′Y = RY if Y = X by definition. If M′, w′ |= ¬[U]ψ
then R′X = RX ∪ S for some ∅ = S ⊆ ||¬ψ||M because M′, w′ |= [X ]ψ ∧ ¬[U]ψ.
So R′X = RX ∩ ||ψ||M. Otherwise, if M′, w′ |= [U]ψ then R′X = RX by definition.
So R′X = RX ∩ ||ψ||M because M′, w′ |= [X ]ψ. In both cases R′X = RX ∩ ||ψ||M.
Therefore (M, w) X+ψ−→ (M′, w′).
3.2 Logic
The language of the logic DCxt is obtained by adding the dynamic operators [X+ψ]
and [X−ψ] to the language LCxt:
LDCxt : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [X ]ϕ | [U]ϕ | [X+ψ]ϕ | [X−ψ]ϕ
where p ranges over Φ, X over C and ψ over LCxt. [X+ψ]ϕ reads ‘after the expansion
of the context X by ψ, ϕ is true’, and [X−ψ]ϕ reads ‘after any contraction of the context
X by ψ, ϕ is true’.
Definition 4. Let M be a Cxt-model. The truth conditions for LDCxt in M are those
of Definition 2, plus:
M, w |= [X+ψ]ϕ iff M′, w′ |= ϕ for all Cxt-models (M′, w′)
such that (M, w) X+ψ−→ (M′, w′);
M, w |= [X−ψ]ϕ iff M′, w′ |= ϕ for all Cxt-models (M′, w′)
such that (M, w) X−ψ−→ (M′, w′).
As before,M |= ϕ iff M, w |= ϕ for all w ∈ M, and ϕ is DCxt-valid (|=DCxt ϕ) iff
M |= ϕ for all Cxt-models M.
The operator [X−ψ] is thus useful if we want to have general properties about our family
of contractions or about a situation; for example, given some formulas ψ1, . . . , ψn, what
would be true after any sequence of contractions and expansions by these formulas? Can
we get an inconsistency with a specific choice of contractions?
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In order to axiomatize the DCxt-validities we define for every X ∈ C two auxiliary
languages L=X and L=X :
L=X : ϕ ::= [X ]α | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
L=X : ϕ ::= α | [Y ]α | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where α ranges over LProp and Y over (C ∪ {U})− {X}.
Logic DCxt is axiomatized by the following schemata:
(Cxt) All axiom schemas and inference rules of Cxt
(R+1) [X+ψ]ϕ=X ↔ ϕ=X
(R+2) [X+ψ][X ]α ↔ [X ](ψ → α)
(R+3) [X+ψ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[X+ψ]ϕ
(R−1) [X−ψ](ϕ=X ∨ ϕ=X) ↔ (ϕ=X ∨ [X−ψ]ϕX)
(R−2) ¬[X−ψ]⊥
(R−3) [X−ψ]([X ]α1 ∨ . . . ∨ [X ]αn ∨ 〈X〉α) ↔
((¬[X ]ψ ∨ [U]ψ) ∧ ([X ]α1 ∨ . . . ∨ [X ]αn ∨ 〈X〉α))




([X ]αi ∧ [U](ψ ∨ αi))) ∨ 〈X〉α ∨ [U](ψ ∨ α)))
(K+) [X+ψ](ϕ → ϕ′) → ([X+ψ]ϕ → [X+ψ]ϕ′)
(K−) [X−ψ](ϕ → ϕ′) → ([X−ψ]ϕ → [X−ψ]ϕ′)
(RRE) Rule of replacement of proved equivalence
where X ∈ C, ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ LDCxt, ψ ∈ LCxt, ϕ=X ∈ L=X , ϕ=X ∈ L=X , and α, αi . . . ∈
LProp.
Note that from (R−1) and (R−2) one can deduce [X−ψ]ϕ=X ↔ ϕ=X . The formulae
above are reduction axioms:
Proposition 3. For all ϕDCxt ∈ LDCxt there is ϕCxt ∈ LCxt such that DCxt
ϕDCxt ↔ ϕCxt.
Proof (Sketch of proof). (By induction on the number of occurrences of dynamic op-
erators.) Let ϕDCxt ∈ LDCxt and ϕ′DCxt be one of its sub-formulas of the form
[X+ψ]ϕCxt or [X−ψ]ϕCxt, with ϕCxt ∈ LCxt. By Proposition 1, there is ϕ1Cxt ∈
L1Cxt such that Cxt ϕCxt ↔ ϕ1Cxt. So DCxt [X+ψ]ϕCxt ↔ [X+ψ]ϕ1Cxt by (REE)
and (K+). Now, thanks to axioms (R+1), (R+2) and (R+3) and because ϕ1Cxt ∈ L1Cxt,
one can easily show that there is ψCxt ∈ LCxt such that DCxt [X+ψ]ϕ1Cxt ↔ ψCxt.
For the case [X−ψ]ϕCxt we apply the same method using (R−1), (R−2) and (R−3). So
DCxt ϕ′DCxt ↔ ψCxt. Now we replace ϕ′DCxt by ψCxt in ϕDCxt. This yields an
equivalent formula (thanks to (RRE)) with one dynamic operator less. We then apply to
this formula the same process we applied to ϕCxt until we get rid of all the dynamic
operators.
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So, if we want to check that a given formula of the form [X ± ψ1] . . . [X ± ψn]ϕ holds
in a Cxt-model, instead of computing all the corresponding sequences of contractions
and expansions ψ1, . . . , ψn of the Cxt-model, we can also reduce the formula to one
of LCxt and check it on the original Cxt-model. This way to proceed might be com-
putationally less costly. For example, DCxt [X−α]¬[X ]α ↔ 〈U〉¬α. As in DEL,
soundness, completeness and decidability follow from Proposition 3:
Theorem 3. |=DCxt ϕ iff DCxt ϕ. Deciding DCxt-validity is decidable.
Finally, it should be noted that we could easily enrich this formalism with specific
contraction operators. For example we could add to LDCxt the contraction operator
[X  ψ]ϕ whose semantics would be defined as follows: forM = (W,R, I),M, w |=
[X  ψ]ϕ iff M′, w |= ϕ, where M′ = (W,R′, I) with R′Y = RY for Y = X and
R′X = RX ∪ {w ∈ W | M, w |= ¬ψ}. To get a complete axiomatization, we just
have to add to DCxt the following axiom schemas: (1) [X  ψ]ϕ=X ↔ ϕ=X ; (2)
[X  ψ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[X  ψ]ϕ; (3) [X  ψ][X ]α ↔ [X ]α ∧ [U](¬ψ → α); and the
distribution axiom (K). In fact this contraction  belongs to the family of contractions
defined in Definition 3, and so we get DCxt [X−ψ]ϕ → [X  ψ]ϕ.
4 A Logical Account of Norm Change
Just as we defined the static notions of obligation and classificatory rules on the basis
of Cxt, we can in the same spirit define the dynamic notions of promulgation and
derogation of obligation and classificatory rules on the basis of DCxt:
+(ϕ ⇒X ψ) def= X+(ϕ → ψ) +OXψ def= X+(¬ψ → V)
−(ϕ ⇒X ψ) def= X−(ϕ → ψ) −OXψ def= X−(¬ψ → V)
Operator [+(ϕ ⇒X ψ)]χ (resp. [−(ϕ ⇒X ψ)]χ) should be read ‘after the promulga-
tion (resp. after any derogation) of the classificatory rule ϕ ⇒X ψ, χ is true’. Likewise,
[+OXψ]ϕ (resp. [−OXψ]ϕ) should be read ‘after the promulgation (resp. after any dero-
gation) within context X of the obligation ψ, χ is true’.
Example 3 (Changing a toy normative system). In Example 2, after the legislator’s
proclamation that motorized vehicles having more than 50cc (mf ) are obliged to have
a numberplate (event+OX((mt ∧ mf ) → pl ) and that motorized vehicles having less
than 50cc (¬mf ) are not obliged to have a numberplate (event−OX((mt ∧ ¬mf ) →
pl ) we should expect that motorbikes having more than 50cc have the obligation to
have a numberplate and motorbikes having less than 50cc have the permission
not to have a numberplate. This is indeed the case as the following formula is a
theorem:
PU(mt ∧ ¬mf ∧ ¬pl) → ([+OX((mt ∧mf ) → pl)][−OX((mt ∧ ¬mf ) → pl)]
OX((mt ∧mf ) → pl) ∧PX(mt ∧ ¬mf ∧ ¬pl)).
More generally, we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 4. The following formulae are DCxt-theorems:
[+(ϕ ⇒X ψ)]ϕ ⇒X ψ (4)
[+OXψ]OXψ (5)
PU¬ψ → [−OXψ]PX¬ψ (6)
((ϕ ⇒X ψ) ∧ 〈U〉¬(ϕ → ψ)) → (7)
[−(ϕ ⇒X ψ)][+(ϕ ⇒X ¬ψ)]¬((ϕ ⇒X ¬ψ) ∧ (ϕ ⇒X ψ))
(OX(ϕ → ψ) ∧PU¬(ϕ → ψ)) → (8)
[−OX(ϕ → ψ)][+OX(ϕ → ¬ψ)]¬(OX(ϕ → ¬ψ) ∧OX(ϕ → ψ))
(PU¬(ψ → ϕ) ∧OXϕ) → [−OX(ψ → ϕ)]¬OXϕ (9)
(ϕ ⇒X ψ) → ([−OXϕ]ξ → [−OXψ]ξ) (10)
(〈U〉¬(ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ϕ ⇒X ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒X ξ)) → 〈−ϕ ⇒X ψ〉¬(ϕ ⇒X ξ) (11)
¬[X ]ψ → (ϕ ↔ [X−ψ]ϕ) (12)
α → [X−ψ][X+ψ]α for α ∈ LProp (13)
[Y ]α → [X−ψ][X+ψ][Y ]α for α ∈ LProp (14)
Proofs are omitted for space reasons but the theorems can easily be checked semanti-
cally. Let us spell out the intuitive readings of these formulae. Formulae 4 and 5 simply
state the obvious consequences of the expansion of a context with a classificatory rule
and with an obligation. Formula 6 states that if a state of affairs can possibly be permit-
ted, then derogating the obligation for that state of affairs gives rise to a permission for
that state of affairs. It is worth noticing that this captures a notion of “strong permission”,
as it is often called in the literature on deontic logic (see, for instance, [11]), that is, a
permission which is obtained as the effect of an explicit derogation to norms in force.
Formulae 8 and 9 describe recipes for appropriately updating contexts. For instance, For-
mula 9 roughly says that if I want to make ¬ψ obligatory in ϕ-situations starting from
a context where ψ is instead obligatory, I have to first derogate this latter obligation and
then promulgate the desired one if I do not want to end up in situations where both ψ and
¬ψ are obligatory. Formula 9 states that if ϕ is obligatory, then by derogating that ϕ is
obligatory in ψ-situations, an exception is introduced so that ϕ is not obligatory in an un-
conditional way any more. Formula 10 says that, in the presence of a classificatory rule,
by derogating the obligatoriness of the antecedent of the rule, we obtain a derogation
of the obligatoriness of its consequent too. Finally, Formula 11 states that if I have two
interpolated classificatory rules, by derogating one of them I undercut the conclusion
I could draw by transitivity before the derogation. Formulae 12-14 are reminiscent of
AGM postulates. Formula 12 expresses a form of minimality criterion, while Formulae
13 and 14 state two recovery principles for formulae belonging to a restricted language.
5 Related Work on Norm Change
Formal models of norm change have been drawing attention since the seminal work
of Alchourro´n and Makinson on the logical structure of derogation in legal codes [3]
which expanded into a more general investigation of the logic of theory change (alias
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belief change) [2]. In this section we position our work with respect to AGM and related
approaches to norm change available in the literature.
The first thing to notice about AGM is that its models are about the contraction
of LProp-theories, and focus on minimal change. In contrast, we consider here a modal
languageLCxt. Our contraction operator “−” allows to express properties about a family
of contractions, which actually do not necessarily satisfy the AGM criteria of minimal
change. However, as shown in Proposition 4, our operator enjoys a minimality criterion
(Formula 12) and two forms of recovery (Formulae 13 and 14). With respect to recovery
it should be noticed, on the other hand, that formula ¬[X ]p → [X−p][X+p]¬[X ]p is
instead invalid, and hence that Formulae 13 and 14 do not generalize to all formulae in
LCxt.
Recently, norm change has gained quite some attention in the multi-agent systems
community. As it is often the case, two main methodological approaches are recogniz-
able: on the one hand syntactic approaches—inspired by legal practice—where norm
change is considered as an operation performed directly on the explicit provisions con-
tained in the “code” of the normative system [6, 8], and on the other hand semantic
approaches, which are inspired by the dynamic logic paradigm [21] and which look at
norm change as some form of model-update. Our contribution clearly falls in the sec-
ond group and for this very reason our logic can be used for the formal specification
and verification of computational models of norm-based interaction. Our approach is in
fact close in spirit to Segerberg’s [16], who argued for an integration of AGM belief re-
vision with Hintikka-like static logics of belief: we here do the same for ‘Andersonian’
deontic logic.
From the proposals belonging to this latter group, it is worth comparing our work in
particular with the approach proposed in [14]. There, an extension of the dynamic logic
of permission (DLP) of [20] with operations of granting or revoking a permission was
proposed. They call DLPdyn this DLP extension. Their operations are similar to our op-
erations of norm promulgation and norm derogation. DLP is itself an extension of PDL
(propositional dynamic logic) [10] where actions are used to label transitions from one
state to another state in a model. The DLPdyn operation of granting a permission just
augments the number of permitted transitions in a model, whereas the operation of re-
voking a permission reduces the number of permitted transitions. However there are
important differences between our approach and Pucella & Weissman’s. For us, norma-
tive systems are more basic than obligations and permissions, and the latter are defined
from (and grounded on) the former. Moreover, dynamics of obligations and permis-
sions are particular cases of normative system change (normative system expansion and
contraction). Thus, we can safely argue that our approach is more general than Pucella
& Weissman’s in which only dynamics of permissions are considered. It is also to be
noted that, while in our approach classificatory rules and their dynamics are crucial con-
cepts in normative change, in DLPdyn they are not considered and even not expressible.
In future work we will analyze the relationships between DLPdyn and our logic, and
possibly a reduction of DLPdyn to our logic DCxt.
While Pucella & Weissman’s revocation of permissions corresponds to public an-
nouncements in DEL, no DEL approaches have proposed the counterpart of their oper-
ation of granting permissions, alias contractions (with the exception of [19], but in the
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framework of a logic of preference). Arguably, the reason for it is that it is difficult to
define contraction operations both preserving standard properties of epistemic models
such as transitivity and Euclidianity and allowing for reduction axioms. This is made
instead possible in DCxt by the intercontextual interaction axioms 4XY and 5XY .
6 Conclusions
We have introduced and studied a dynamic logic accounting for context change, and
have applied it to analyze several aspects of the dynamics of norms, viz. the dynamics
of permissions, obligations and classificatory rules. Although the logic has been applied
here only to provide a formal analysis of norm-change, it is clear that its range of ap-
plication is much broader. Viewed in its generality, the logic is a logic of the dynamics
of propositional theories, and as such, can be naturally applied to formal epistemology
by studying theory-change, or to non-monotonic reasoning by studying how the con-
text of an argumentation evolves during, for instance, a dialogue game. This kind of
applications are future research.
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